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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
		MAY 1995	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <i>The Inter-American System And Post-Cold War Changes: Kant is the Key</i>			5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) <i>David Parnell Hinckley</i>			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) AFIT Students Attending: <i>New Mexico State University</i>		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER AFIT/CI/CIA <i>95-037</i>	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AFIT/CI 2950 P STREET, BLDG 125 WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH 45433-7765		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER <i>1</i>	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 			
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release LAW AFR 190-1 Distribution Unlimited BRIAN D. GAUTHIER, MSGT, USAF Chief Administration		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)			
14. SUBJECT TERMS		15. NUMBER OF PAGES <i>77</i>	
		16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

**THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND POST-COLD WAR
CHANGES:**

KANT IS THE KEY

by

David Parnell Hinckley

**Bachelor of Arts, Foreign Languages, New Mexico State
University, 1989**

THESIS

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts in Latin American Studies

The University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, New Mexico

May, 1995

19950710080

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Distribution/ _____	
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank all of those who have contributed their time and resources that made the research and completion of this topic possible; Major Dave Phares, Inter-American Defense Board; Mr. Bill Mock, Inter-American, Regional Security Affairs; Major Bill Cardenas, U.S. Delegation to the Inter-American Defense Board; Lt. Col. John Goetchius, Office of Strategic Planning; Dr. Dick Downs, North South Center; Mr. J. Cope, Institute for National Strategic Studies; Major Hollis, Inter-American Defense College; Lt. Col. Ramón Martínez, Chief of Protocol, Inter-American Defense Board; Mr. Joe Leuer, School of the Americas; Dr. Paul Buchanon, University of Arizona; Dr. Ken Roberts, Political Science Department, University of New Mexico; Dr. Gil Merkx, Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico; and lastly to Dr. Mark Peceny, Political Science Department, University of New Mexico for his unwavering guidance and optimism.

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ABSTRACT

For the past fifty years, organs of the Inter-American System have been ignored, under-funded, and poorly utilized. After so many years of neglect and abuse, the Organization of American States (OAS) and Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) are entering into a new era of hemispheric cooperation where democracy promotion has replaced Cold War paradigms.

Graham Allison's bureaucratic politics approach argues that the various institutions of the Inter-American System will change very little in this new era because of institutional resistance to change. The problem is, contrary to Allison's predictions, the OAS and IADB have

made some radical changes. The OAS now plays a very active role in the hemisphere and the IADB carries out new non-traditional military roles.

The realist approach argues that the U.S. has simply dropped its Cold War interests for democracy promotion, human rights, and hemispheric cooperation. Rapid institutional change, the realists argue, is directly attributed to pressure brought to bear on the Inter-American System by the powerful U.S. in pursuit of its own new interests.

Kantian liberalism on the other hand, argues that the widespread growth of representative democracy has in and of itself, led to a hemispheric consensus that provides unprecedented support for the Inter-American System. The Kantian approach states that the System is being changed to reflect the common democratic goals and interests of a predominantly democratic western hemisphere. By further exploring the various aspects of Graham Allison's argument, the realist approach, and Kantian liberalism, this thesis will show that Kantian liberalism offers the best explanation for institutional change in the western hemisphere.

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I. INTRODUCTION

For the past fifty years, organs of the Inter-American System have been ignored, under-funded, and poorly utilized. The Organization of American States' (OAS) Charter was little more than a piece of paper that no one paid attention to, and the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) as the military organ of the System was distrusted and forced to keep a low profile. After so many years of neglect and abuse, these organs of the Inter-American System are entering into a new era free from communist paranoia and void of the heated competition of the Cold War.

Graham Allison's bureaucratic politics approach argues that the various institutions of the Inter-American System will change very little in this new era. He states that the inflexible nature and built in "organizational rigidities" of institutions present tremendous resistance to any kind of change. The problem is, contrary to Allison's predictions, the OAS has made some radical changes. It has gone from sitting in the background doing nothing, to directing sanctions against coup leaders, leading the fight for representative democracy, and taking charge of hemispheric problems. The IADB also has made great changes by taking on new non-traditional military roles; while its educational branch, the Inter-American Defense College (IADC) offers a revamped curriculum and now accepts civilian students from

all OAS nations.

In response to a shift in the global balance-of-power and budget restraints, the U.S. has made significant political changes and the military is undergoing a force draw-down. In addition, the military modified the curriculum of its military education programs to reflect the new consensus of democratic values.

If Graham Allison's argument is correct and bureaucratic institutions can only make little changes at a slow rate, then why is there so much rapid institutional change going on in the Inter-American System? It is clear that Allison's argument does not hold the answer to this question, but other theories will help to explain these changes.

The realist approach argues that the U.S. has simply dropped its Cold War interests for new ones now that its struggle with the Soviet Union is over. Its new interests include the promotion of democracy, human rights, and hemispheric cooperation. The realist approach contends that the U.S. uses its overwhelming influence to push, cajole, coerce, and force its new agenda onto its neighbors. Rapid institutional change, the realists argue, is therefore directly attributed to the pressure brought to bear on the Inter-American System by the powerful U.S. in pursuit of its

own new interests.

Kantian liberalism on the other hand, argues that the dramatic widespread growth of representative democracy has in and of itself, led to a hemispheric consensus. This democratic consensus has provided unprecedented support for an Inter-American System that will bring the democracies of the western hemisphere together. Kantian liberalism attributes widespread institutional changes to the positive effects of the democratic consensus.

By further exploring the various aspects of Graham Allison's argument, the realist approach, and Kantian liberalism, this thesis will show that Kantian liberalism offers the best explanation for institutional change in the western hemisphere. Next, the historical events that led to the current changes now occurring in the OAS and the IADB will be presented. Finally, certain U.S. policy changes will be addressed, followed by an analysis of the dynamics of these institutions and my concluding remarks.

II. THEORETICAL APPROACHES

The various approaches of Graham Allison, realism, and Kantian liberalism will be used to analyze and explain current changes in the Inter-American System. Graham Allison's model II was initially chosen because of its in depth explanation of how large organizations and bureaucracies work and deal with changing environments. Allison draws the framework for his model II largely from the works of March, Simon, Barnard, and Roethlisberger. Allison explains that governments consist of large organizations which are responsible for specific tasks, and each organization focuses on its own particular problems largely in an independent manner.¹

In order to function and perform complex routines, organizations must organize and coordinate large numbers of individuals. Such coordination requires the establishment of standard operating procedures (SOP's). Allison argues that the "...behavior of these organizations-and consequently of the government-relevant to an issue in any particular instance is, therefore, determined primarily by routines established in these organizations prior to that

¹Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Harvard, 1971), p. 69.

instance."² When applied to the topic of research, Allison's argument paints a picture of the OAS, IADB, and the U.S. military as bureaucracies trying to function today with fixed sets of standard operating procedures acquired during the Cold War.

The very routines and procedures that permit the day-to-day operation and functioning of bureaucratic organizations are also the "organizational rigidities" that lead these organizations to satisfy minimal goals instead of seeking the action with the best consequences.³ These fixed sets of standard operating procedures and programs embed a type of rigid behavior to organizations that is very difficult to overcome. Therefore, these bureaucracies offer tremendous resistance to change or to anything that upsets the way things are traditionally done.

Graham Allison states that organizations can learn and eventually change, but that "learning occurs gradually, over time."⁴ While Allison used his argument to explain bureaucratic behavior within states, the same broad principles should apply to international institutions

²Ibid., p. 68.

³Irving Janis, Groupthink, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1982), p. 6.

⁴Allison, op. cit., p. 68.

because they also use standard operating procedures to manage large numbers of employees and have to deal with the same "organizational rigidities" inherent to all institutions. According to his model, bureaucratic inertia was supposed to retard any significant change in the organs of the Inter-American System. This is not the case, because the OAS and IADB are nearly tripping over themselves in their efforts to change to meet the challenges of their new environment. The U.S. is also being forced to change due to its new environment of budget cuts, force draw-downs and the shift in the global balance-of-power.

The realist approach is better than Graham Allison's model for explaining the changes in the Inter-American System, because an important part of the realist approach deals with how the balance-of-power affects international relations. Realists maintain that the international balance-of-power explains the results of states' actions under given conditions. Kenneth Waltz said,

If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance-of-power theory is it. A balance-of-power theory, properly stated, begins with assumptions about states: They are unitary actors who at a minimum seek their own preservation and at a maximum drive for universal domination. States, or those who acted for them, try in more or less sensible ways to use the means

available in order to achieve the ends in view.⁵

During the Cold War the balance-of-power was a bipolar split between two world superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. A bipolar balance-of-power is less stable than hegemony, but is relatively stable in comparison to a multipolar situation. Bipolarity creates both conflict and caution, and as a result, violence is usually limited to proxy wars in peripheral states. Realists claim that U.S. unilateral action and strong-arm tactics in Latin America during the Cold War were driven by the global balance-of-power.

Realists also argue that the U.S. acted unilaterally in the western hemisphere, because the balance-of-power in the region made the U.S. a regional hegemony. For many years, the U.S. has been overwhelmingly powerful in the region and kept its weaker Latin American neighbors in line with a "big stick." The foreign policies of the hemispheric states were dictated by the foreign policy of the U.S., and as a Greek historian named Thucydides once said, "the strong do what they can and the weak do what they must." The United States used its military power, economic resources, and the Inter-

⁵Kenneth Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Princeton, 1989), p. 97.

American System for years to run the western hemisphere in ways that would maintain U.S. predominance and protect its interests. After years of this abuse, the ravaged OAS lost all credibility in the eyes of its member states who saw it just as another tool of the U.S. to force foreign policy down their throats.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union produced a tremendous shift in the balance-of-power to the U.S. side and made it a global hegemon. With no major threats to its position or power, the U.S. now enjoys the fruits and benefits that come with being a global hegemon. As a hegemonic state, the U.S. can move on to pursue ideological goals, such as, structuring the international system in its own image because its more basic needs (protecting territorial and political integrity) are no longer threatened. "Only states whose resources are very large, both absolutely and relatively, can engage in imperial policies, can attempt to impose their vision on other countries and the global system."⁶

Realists argue that the Inter-American System is changing because the U.S. is now a global hegemon and can freely indulge in ideological foreign policies, like

⁶Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton, 1978), p. 340.

democracy promotion, because its core objectives are not in jeopardy. Although the realist theory explains what is happening to the Inter-American System in the Post-Cold War era far better than Graham Allison, Kantian liberalism offers the best explanation.

Back in 1795, before weapons of mass destruction and Cold War stalemates, Immanuel Kant wrote, "Perpetual Peace" in which he argued that the spread of liberal philosophy, international commerce, and democracy would lead to greater peace through cooperation among liberal states. He stated that "...Perpetual Peace will be guaranteed by the ever-widening acceptance of three 'definitive articles' of peace."⁷ The first definitive article holds that the civil constitution of the state must be a republican society that has solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order. The state must have a society that respects private property, a market-oriented economy, and recognize the legal equality of its citizens. The second article states liberal republics will progressively establish peace among themselves through a "pacific union." The third definitive article of the

⁷Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part One, Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 12, No. 3 Summer 1983, p. 225.

Eternal Peace establishes a common law that operates together with the pacific union.⁸

According to Kant, the three definitive articles help create "institutional constraints," which are made by a division of powers, checks, and balances that make it difficult for democratically elected leaders to bring their countries to war. When it comes to war, democracies are restrained by the need to ensure a broad base of popular support. Leaders must gain the support of the legislature, private interest groups, as well as, the favor of public opinion in order to gain legitimacy for their actions. Public opinion can place a heavy restraint on whether or not a democracy goes to war, because it is the general populace which will have to pay the price of war in money and blood. This type of restraint has been named the structural approach in the contemporary literature from the Kantian perspective.

The structural model suggests that violent conflict between two democracies confronting each other is not feasible, because complex political mobilization processes impose constraints on the political leaders. In the structural model, international action requires the support

⁸Loc. cit.

of both the general public and the various institutions that make up a democratic government. Only during what can best be described as "emergencies" can leaders short circuit the system and take international action without political mobilization.⁹

The process of securing a broad base of support is so time consuming and at times risky that democratic leaders do not readily wage wars unless war is deemed necessary or just. By the time two democratic states are militarily ready for war, the diplomats have usually found a nonmilitary solution to the conflict.

This clearly demonstrates the difficult and cumbersome process of national mobilization for war within democracies. In contrast, nondemocratic societies need only gain the support of their key legitimizing groups to launch international action. By ignoring public opinion, nondemocratic governments are able to prepare for war in a much shorter period of time. Not only do democracies take more time getting ready for war, the "...greater the scale, cost, and risk of using violence, the more effort must be

⁹Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," American Political Science Review, 87:3, September 1993, pp. 625-626.

devoted to preparations in public, and of the public."¹⁰

Preparations for war in democracies are so obvious and time consuming that governments confronting them usually expect an opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement (if they want to) before hostilities begin. If both of the countries involved in conflict are democracies, they do not fear a surprise attack nor feel the need to launch a preemptive strike in anticipation of a surprise attack. Perhaps the democratic characteristic of lengthy and public war preparations explain why "...major-power democracies seem never to have launched preventive war (a deliberate attack not under immediate provocation) against another major power (Schweller 1992)."¹¹

The normative model and structural models are two explanations at the forefront of contemporary advocates of Kantian liberalism. The normative model, which has been offered as an alternative to the structural approach, suggests that conflicts of interest between democracies do not escalate into violent clashes due to norms of compromise and cooperation. The normative model holds that disputes

¹⁰Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, 1993), p. 39.

¹¹Loc. cit.

between democracies can be resolved without force through democratic political processes that ensure both majority rule and minority rights. Just as the threat or use of lethal violence is illegal to secure an individual's "legitimate" rights, a state's monopoly on the use of force is normatively restrained. These normative restraints on violent behavior by the state and its citizens keep incidents of the organized use of force rare. This dynamic explains both the rarity of war between democracies and the high level of cooperation between them.

In disputes between democracies, there is the expectation that they can be settled peacefully and conflicts are more likely to be settled by third-party conflict management, agreement, compromise, or stalemate.¹² This is not to say that countries that have the same government type in common do not go to war. If this were true, there would have been peace between the Soviet Union and China, between the Soviet Union and its formerly communist East European neighbors, and between China and Vietnam.¹³ Bruce Russett, sums up the normative argument

¹²William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, 88:1, March 1994.

¹³Russett, op. cit., p. 25.

when he says,

...the culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic countries. In short, if people in a democracy perceive themselves as autonomous, self-governing people who share norms of live-and-let-live, they will respect the rights of others to self-determination if those others are also perceived as self-governing and hence not easily led into aggressive foreign policies by a self serving elite. The same structures and behaviors that "we" assume will limit our aggression, both internally and externally, may be expected similarly to limit similarly governed people in other polities. Those who claim the principle of self-determination for themselves are expected to extend it to others.¹⁴

The normative and structural models are not clearly separated from each other, but they do emphasize two different aspects of why democracies do not fight each other. The structural model looks at the legal and constitutional restraints placed on political leaders of democracies as an indicator of how democracies behave in the international arena. The normative model focuses on the norms of domestic political behavior in democracies and its effects on international politics.¹⁵

At this point, it is important to note that although democratic states are not known to fight each other, they

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 32-33.

¹⁵Maoz, op. cit., pp. 626.

are "...no less likely to become involved in foreign wars, crises, or potentially violent disputes than states organized under alternative governing arrangements (Chan 1984; Domke 1988; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Small and Singer 1976; Weede 1984; Wright 1942)." ¹⁶ Democracies are in general about as conflict- and war-prone as nondemocracies.¹⁷ The restraint that one democracy holds for another does not apply toward a country governed by nondemocratic principles. Democracies tend to regard the actions of non-liberal governments with mistrust and caution, because non-liberal governments exploit their own people. States that are liberally governed expect that authoritarian states will aggress against others if given the opportunity and power. From a democratic viewpoint, war against another democratic state is neither expected nor considered legitimate, while on the other hand, wars against authoritarian states are usually both.

When a democratic state confronts a nondemocratic one, it may be forced to change its norms of behavior to avoid having its typically "dovish" nature abused. A democratic state is likely to adopt the norms of the nondemocratic

¹⁶Dixon, op. cit., p. 14.

¹⁷Maoz, op. cit., p. 624.

state in order to deal with the threat on equal footing, e.g., the use of forceful conduct to resolve conflict through a decisive outcome and elimination of the opponent.¹⁸ The democratic norm of live-and-let-live does not apply toward authoritarian states whose rulers "...do not behave in a just way that respects their own people's rights to self-determination," and "cannot be expected to behave better toward peoples outside their states."¹⁹

With its in-depth study of how democracies interact, Kantian liberalism helps shed some light on the current actions of the OAS, IADB, and the U.S. While Allison focuses on how institutions are resistant to change and realism looks at the U.S. imposing its new agenda on the Inter-American System, the Kantian argument suggests that as the international environment becomes more liberal, the Inter-American institutions also will become more liberal. This is a direct response to the environment in which they operate. With the spread of democracy, free trade, and complex interdependence, the Inter-American System is becoming a Kantian "pacific union" of liberal states. These changes have opened up new prospects for the Inter-American

¹⁸Russett, op. cit., p. 33.

¹⁹Loc. cit.

System as its agenda moves from unilateral to multilateral actions. Multilateralism makes collective action more affordable, cost-effective, and efficient than unilateralism, both in economic and political terms creating greater incentives for change.²⁰ Multilateralism is made possible because of a consensus on basic goals, and a shared trust is made possible by shared liberalism. Basic goals Latin American nations share are found in the "democratic consensus" that has developed in the region. This consensus has made multilateralism a reality and explains the rapid changes individual organs of the Inter-American System are undergoing as they take on newer and greater roles in promoting democracy in the western hemisphere.

²⁰César Gaviria Trujillo, Speech at Georgetown University, November 9, 1994.

III. INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

This section argues that while realism explains what happened in the western hemisphere during the 1948-1989 time frame, Kantian liberalism best explains what is happening during the 1990s. The realist argument explains that the bipolar conflict during the Cold War was so intense it drove the U.S. to abuse the Inter-American System as it aggressively pursued an uncompromising anticommunist policy. In the western hemisphere, this period of ardent competition between the two superpowers was characterized by U.S. unilateralism. Although realism explains what happened to the Inter-American System during the Cold War, it cannot account for the rapid Post-Cold War changes now occurring in the System. Kantian liberalism on the other hand, offers a clear explanation of just what is driving the rapid changes in this new era.

The Inter-American System is the oldest multilateral organization in the international system, and was established to meet the political, economic, social, and military requirements of the nations of the western hemisphere. It consists of principles, purposes, objectives, treaties, and agreements, as well as, the organizations and agencies designed to implement them or

bring them to fruition.²¹ The Inter-American System is composed of the following organs:

- The government of each member state
- The Organization of American States (OAS)
- The Autonomous Inter-American entities (such as the IADB)

Over the years, this System was bypassed by U.S. unilateral action and pushed into the background of international affairs where it was ignored and neglected. Today, with the end of strategic confrontation between communism and capitalism, the international system has become more democratic, new actors have entered the scene, and interests have become more diverse. The spread of liberal democracy and an atmosphere of greater pluralism facilitates internationalism, multilateralism, and collective action. These dynamics indicate a clear preference in the western hemisphere for collective action over unilateral action in a more pluralistic international system.

Currently, Latin America is faced with a growing number of problems which escape national grasp that have regional, if not global implications. By aggressively confronting

²¹Commander Elena W. Brown and Colonel George Allport, The Role of the Inter-American Defense Board Within the New World Order: An Individual Study Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (undated), p. 8.

these issues and jumping on the "bandwagon" of the emerging new world, the Inter-American System and the OAS in particular, have received renewed interest from national leaders in the western hemisphere.²²

The OAS has thirty-five members and is the world's oldest regional organization (table 1). When it was created in 1948, it was the culmination of attempts dating back to the early 1800s to establish an international organization tailored to meet the political, economic, and security needs of the western hemisphere. The first concrete attempt to create a regional organization in America was made in 1826, by Simon Bolivar in Panama City. There the "Treaty of Perpetual Union, League, and Confederation" was signed by the only attending delegates who were from Colombia, Central America, Peru, and Mexico.²³ In 1890, the First International Conference of American States met in Washington and established an association under the title of "The International Union of American Republics." The purpose of the Union was the collection and distribution of commercial information. Latin Americans however, harbored suspicions about the idea of integrating their economies

²²Trujillo, op. cit.

²³M. Margaret Ball, The OAS in Transition (Durham, N.C., 1969), p. 5.

into the "...U.S. industrial powerhouse. They saw the entire scheme as little more than a device for allowing the State Department to direct Latin American affairs."²⁴ Eight more International Conferences of American States took place between 1901 and 1938, manifesting considerable continuity for that period of time. The next conference was held in 1945, and was called the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace. Its main focus was on defense issues and it passed two measures of note. The first measure, Resolution VIII on Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity was known as the "Act of Chapultepec," while the second measure, Resolution IX on the Reorganization was known as the "Consolidation and Strengthening of the Inter-American System." The first one led to the signing of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in 1947, while the second led to the creation of the OAS in order to make the "...Pan American movement more dynamic and more consonant with the new world conditions."²⁵

In 1947, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal

²⁴Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, 2nd ed. (New York, 1993), p. 34.

²⁵Manuel Canyes, The Organization of American States and The United Nations (Washington, D.C., 1958), p. 6.

Assistance (Rio Treaty) was accomplished at Rio de Janeiro and runs along the same lines as Simon Bolivar's "Treaty of Perpetual Union, League, and Confederation." Bolivar's initial attempt in 1826, was finally realized 121 years later on a continental scale. The Rio Treaty is a defense contract between American states that defines a special hemispheric security area and outlines action to be taken in the event of armed attacks or aggression that might endanger the peace of the Americas.²⁶

The Rio Treaty was incorporated into the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) when the Charter was formalized in Bogota in 1948, just after the Americas helped to defeat the fascists in World War II. Many hoped that the OAS would become a consensual cooperative as they faced a communist threat that demanded inter-American cooperation, but all hopes for that were lost in the following Cold War years.

The purpose of the OAS was to maintain peace, security (the Rio Treaty), and promote friendly cooperation in economic, social, and cultural issues. The Charter of the OAS was in effect, a strategic bargain between Latin America and the United States. The United States was supposed to

²⁶Ibid., p. 5.

stop unilateral interventions in Latin America and subject itself to OAS approval over regional security concerns in exchange for Latin America's support to prevent the Soviet led communist movement from getting a foothold in the Americas.

What actually transpired during the Cold War between the U.S., the OAS, and Latin America was a continuance of 20th century U.S. interventionist activity. The U.S. intervened in Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961, and the Dominican Republic in 1965 to name a few.²⁷ Many saw the formation of the OAS which was highly influenced by the U.S., as a continuance of the Monroe Doctrine, in which "...the United States tried - consistently and, generally, successfully - to avoid the UN becoming involved in Latin American political affairs."²⁸

A look at the make up of the members of the OAS also might offer a possible explanation for the aggressive action of the United States. The official formation of the OAS was

²⁷Edward J. Williams, "The Decline of the Organization of American States: An Interpretation," United States Policy Towards Latin America: Antecedents and Alternatives, ed. Lewis A. Tambs (Arizona, 1976), p. 198.

²⁸Richard L. Millett, "Beyond Sovereignty: International Efforts to Support Latin American Democracy," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 36, 3 (Fall 1994): p. 3.

the act of taking the strongest nation on earth with huge global interests and tying it to 20 or more lesser nations whose basic interests were far less outward reaching. It was only a matter of time until the global interests (east-west conflicts, trade, politics, etc.) of the United States overcame its hemispheric obligations.²⁹ This is an example of how the realist argument explains international activity in the western hemisphere during the Cold War.

From the time U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall referred to the emerging East-West struggle at the Bogota Conference in 1948, Cold War concerns took precedence over the OAS and pushed Latin American issues and interests into the background. With the Cold War calling the shots, the U.S. acted unilaterally against what it claimed were serious threats to hemispheric security. The U.S. undermined elected regimes while supporting repressive nondemocratic regimes, and at times provided the catalyst needed for armed conflict in the region. U.S. actions in "...helping to bring down the Arbenz government in Guatemala (1954) and the Allende administration in Chile (1973), facilitating the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs (1961), and the contra

²⁹Williams, op. cit., p. 199.

war in Central America (in the 1980s)"³⁰ are among the most blatant examples of U.S. Cold War policy. The fact that the U.S. was covertly sabotaging democratic governments in Latin America shows that the Kantian argument did not work during the Cold War years.

To get its wishes, the U.S. pressured, intimidated or ignored the OAS throughout the Cold War. The Caracas anticommunist resolution, the Guatemalan, Cuban and Dominican interventions, and the 1962 missile crisis with the following expulsion of Cuba from the OAS illustrates the difficulties and setbacks that rocked the OAS during the Cold War.³¹

Latin Americans were angry and fed up with the U.S. continually intervening unilaterally in their affairs. When the U.S. rammed through the anticommunist resolution at the 1954 Caracas meeting, "...the Guatemalan foreign minister damned the United States-sponsored declaration as 'the internationalization of McCarthyism, the burning of books, and the imposition of stereotyped thought.'"³² The 1965 intervention in Santo Domingo did substantial damage to the

³⁰Millett, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

³¹Williams, op. cit., p. 199.

³²Loc. cit.

credibility and peace-keeping competence of the OAS.

After the U.S. completely bypassed the Rio Treaty procedures during the Malvinas-Falkland Island War because of loyalty to NATO, the OAS lost what little was left of its prestige and political clout, and became little more than a parking lot for mediocre diplomatic representatives. By all outward appearances, the Cold War had pushed the U.S. into a series of occupations and interventions contrary to both the letter and spirit of the OAS Charter. These actions by the U.S. left Latin Americans little faith in the usefulness of the OAS as any thing more than an instrument of U.S. Cold War policy. Realism demonstrates that while the U.S. was locked in mortal combat with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, its strong-armed, unilateral actions, and covert activities in the region only served to gut the OAS and turn the Inter-American System into a vast wasteland.

Now that the east-west conflict is over, the realist argument maintains that the U.S. has just shifted the focus of its interests to what it now sees as an integral part of its National Security: the promotion of democracy. Realists would argue that the U.S. is still calling the shots in the western hemisphere because it is the global hegemon, and has the luxury of pursuing ideologically driven goals. According to the realist argument, the nations of

the western hemisphere are forced to go along with what the U.S. dictates because they are so much smaller and it is ultimately in their best interest not to antagonize their giant neighbor. The problem with the realist argument is however, that it does not answer the question of why the Inter-American System is undergoing a dramatic metamorphosis from desolate wasteland, to a viable organization that is the focus of multilateral cooperation in the western hemisphere.

Kantian liberalism offers the best explanation for Post-Cold War changes in the western hemisphere. The Kantian liberal approach attributes the rapid changes in the Inter-American System to the region-wide democratic consensus that has allowed Latin America to come together under common democratic values and pursue common goals.

In the Post-Cold War era, the OAS is no longer buffeted by U.S. efforts to maintain its containment policy, and is free to focus on its own policies and goals. The OAS is using this Post-Cold War freedom to concentrate on dealing with its new environment: a western hemisphere that is for the most part, democratically governed. Fifteen years ago, only three of sixteen South and Central American countries

had elected leaders, Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica.³³ Today, "...nineteen of the twenty countries, and over 95 percent of the Latin American populations, live under democracy or under regimes aspiring or in transition to democracy."³⁴ The resurgence of democracy in the western hemisphere is helping the democratic consensus build strength and gather momentum. The democratic consensus provides the OAS with untold opportunities, but it also poses a considerable challenge because it is new territory where the OAS has had little previous hands on experience.

Although a western hemisphere unified behind a democratic consensus and democratic values is a new experience for the OAS, democracy is not a new concept. From the beginning of the Inter-American System, the "democratic ideal" was often exalted while at the same time member states exercised dictatorial powers. One of the principles listed by the OAS Charter of 1948 states that the "...solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective

³³"Convergence and Community: The Americas in 1993," The Inter-American Dialogue (Washington, D.C., 1992), p. 23.

³⁴Howard J. Wiarda, American Foreign Policy Toward Latin America in the 80s and 90s: Issues and Controversies from Reagan to Bush (New York, 1992), p. 305.

exercise of representative democracy."³⁵ Additional references to democracy were made in Resolutions XXX and XXXII of the Ninth Conference. The former provided a "...new positive approach to representative democracy," while the latter "...pointed out that social justice should be achieved within the framework of democratic government."³⁶

Even though the promotion of democratic values is not something new to the OAS, for years it has been subordinated to a policy of nonintervention and reduced to mere platitudes and rhetoric. The debate surrounds the conviction that people of all nations should be allowed to choose the form of government for their own countries. Some liberals believe however, that true self determination can only take place in some form of republican institution. From the realist viewpoint, noninterventionist policy was an effort by the weak states to try to keep the U.S. from interfering in their countries. When this viewpoint is taken a little further, no one, not the U.S., the OAS, nor anyone has the right or authority to intrude on the "private business" of a nation.

³⁵Charter of the Organization of American States (Washington, D.C., 1948), Chap. 2, Art. 5 (d), p. 3.

³⁶Ball, op. cit., p. 486.

The debate between nonintervention and the "defense of democracy" has been going on for years. The studies, writings, and philosophical arguments of one of the leading proponents of Inter-American cooperation, Argentinean Carlos Calvo, laid the foundation for many Inter-American Conference debates on the topic of nonintervention. Calvo argued that "...commonwealths function well and prosper only when states establish a peaceful relationship according to the principles of national sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity."³⁷ Calvo's six-volume treatise titled, "*Le Droit International Theorique et Pratique*," was first published in Spanish in 1868. In it, he states that maintaining the principles of national sovereignty, and territorial integrity requires applying the rules of non-intervention, law over force, and civic equality. Non-intervention is the right of a country to be free from military or diplomatic intervention. Law over force means that disputes are to be settled by arbitration and international law, not war. Civic equality gives foreigners the same rights and privileges as nationals, and requires foreigners to direct complaints to the local authorities

³⁷Ramón Martínez, "Inter-American Defense Board Fosters Cooperation," North South the Magazine of the Americas (Miami), Vol. 3 No. 3, October-November, 1993, p. 48.

only.³⁸ Although the rule of civic equality was highly contested, history has shown that many of Carlos Calvo's other ideas and principles were followed by the American states as they strove to achieve Inter-American cooperation.

In 1902, Argentine Foreign Minister Luis M. Drago's criticism of U.S. interventions and his call for nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states became the central tenet of regional policy. After thirty-one years, the U.S. finally joined with Latin Americans in 1933, when it ratified the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States which declared that "no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another."³⁹

Through the years, the loudest opponents to a defense-of-democracy regime and the staunchest supporters of a noninterventionist policy were authoritarian regimes. At times, noninterventionists were governments who were worried they weren't living up to the "...principles and norms of the regime, i.e., that their democracies are shams or that they systematically permit human rights abuses by the

³⁸Ibid., p. 49.

³⁹Millett, op cit., pp. 114-117.

authorities."⁴⁰

More recently, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Brazil have been called the modern "noninterventionists," because they are reluctant to go along with a defense-of-democracy regime.⁴¹ They opposed referring the Haiti problem to the UN Security Council because it "posed no threat to peace," and they were worried that if the UN Security Council extended its jurisdiction to issues like democracy, it could continue to encroach upon a country's internal affairs.

A good example of the power of the Kantian argument is that the spread of democracy led to change even at the height of the Cold War. In 1985, the OAS charter was revised emphasizing its role in the promotion and consolidation of democracy. The revision also reinforced democracy as an indispensable condition for stability, peace, and development in the region.⁴²

In a world free from the pressures and competition of the Cold War, the OAS has been able to place more attention

⁴⁰Richard J. Bloomfield, "Advancing Democracy and Human Rights in the Americas," Inter-American Dialogue (Washington, D.C., May 1994), p. 18.

⁴¹Mexico and Peru are two states with the most ambiguous democratic credentials in Latin America.

⁴²"Convergence and Community: The Americas in 1993," op cit., p. 31.

on the promotion of representative democracy. On 15 October 1990, the Secretary General of the OAS established the

Organization of American States
Election Monitoring Missions

1990: Nicaragua, Haiti
1991: El Salvador, Suriname, Paraguay
1992: Peru, Paraguay
1993: Peru, Honduras, Venezuela
1994: Panama, Dominican Republic

Figure 1 - OAS Election Monitoring Missions

Unit for the Promotion of Democracy through Executive Order No. 90-3. The Democracy unit was created to participate in election observation missions, lend its cooperation to strengthen election institutions and procedures, and to support the structures of democracy, especially national and state legislatures. Its advisory services include research, training, and information exchange, while its direct assistance covers technical support and other aid as requested by member states.⁴³ Since 1989, election observation missions have been sent to various countries (figure 1), in response to specific requests from various governments.⁴⁴ Advisory missions also have been sent to countries such as Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, and the Dominican Republic.

⁴³The Americas in 1994: A Time for Leadership, A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue to the Summit of Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Americas (Washington, D.C., October 1994), p. 9.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 11.

At its twenty-first regular session held in Santiago Chile, on 4 June 1991, the General Assembly of the OAS adopted "The Santiago Commitment to Democracy, and the Renewal of the International System," and its accompanying resolutions (table 2). This was the foreign minister's formal recognition of the need for the renewal of the OAS to face the new international challenges and demands. The Declaration of Santiago expanded hemispheric commitment to the promotion and defense of representative democracy.⁴⁵ The following day, they adopted General Assembly Resolution 1080 "Representative Democracy," which implements the Santiago Commitment by creating an automatic mechanism to react to any interruption of democracy among member countries.

Resolution 1080 calls for a mandatory meeting of the OAS permanent Council within ten days following a military coup or other interruption of a legitimate elected government. Resolution 1080 instructs the OAS to impose collective, hemispheric action to pressure for the restoration of constitutional rule. In a speech at Georgetown University on 9 November 1994, Secretary General

⁴⁵Heraldo Muñoz, "A New OAS for the New Times," Latin America in a New World, eds. Abraham F. Lowenthal and Gregory F. Treverton (Colorado, 1994), p. 195.

of the OAS, César Gaviria Trujillo, pointed out that just as nuclear power and the risk of retaliation prevented foolish actions in the past; political rejection by the international community, and the potential for multilateral sanctions or punitive actions contribute to the maintenance of order today.

The Santiago Commitment and Resolution 1080 represent a firm commitment on the part of the OAS countries to promote the protection of human rights, and representative democracy as indispensable conditions for the stability, peace, and development of the region.⁴⁶ Proponents of the realist theory argue that the "Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the International System" is just another part of an U.S.-sponsored agenda that it forced through the OAS. History later proved the realist viewpoint to be incorrect as it showed that not only did Latin American states willingly vote for the Santiago Commitment, they acted on it proving their words were much more than hollow promises. When constitutional rule was terminated in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, the OAS was supported by nearly every country of the hemisphere as it organized significant multilateral responses. Hemispheric cooperation and joint

⁴⁶Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 13.

action are a direct result of the democratic consensus and further demonstrates that the Kantian liberal approach best explains the current changes in the Inter-American System. If the realist appraisal had been correct, and the U.S. had indeed forced a policy on the OAS that Latin American states did not support, then there would have been no cooperation, no multilateral responses, and the U.S. would have been left to act unilaterally as it had done so often throughout the Cold War.

The Santiago Declaration and Resolution 1080 also signaled a major turnaround in the decades-old conflict between self-determination and nonintervention because it gave the OAS more power to direct collective efforts toward building and defending democracy. The noninterventionist countries, which were making efforts to become more democratic, all voted in favor of the Santiago Resolutions.

Another change made by the OAS in the Post-Cold War era is the Protocol of Washington which reformed the Charter in 1992. The Protocol of Washington gives the OAS more clout by taking the actions of Resolution 1080 one step further. Where Resolution 1080 calls for collective hemispheric action and requires a mandatory meeting of the OAS permanent Council within ten days following the forceful termination of a democratic government, the Protocol of Washington

allows "...the OAS to suspend the membership of governments that come to power illegally."⁴⁷

The fact that the Washington Protocol was even proposed, points again to the shift from nonintervention to the promotion of democracy. There are two events that have helped shift the balance toward democracy promotion. One event is the surge in the democratic consensus in the late 1980s, which is the belief that democratic institutions are vital to peaceful and prosperous hemispheric relations. This demonstrates the Kantian "liberal peace" argument. The second event is the end of the Cold War, which "...reduced suspicion that U.S. policies in the name of defending democracy were thinly-veiled excuses to intervene in pursuit of other goals, i.e., anticomunism."⁴⁸ Now, Latin American democracies view the U.S. as another liberal state with the same democratic values, pursuing the same goals.

Another change to the OAS that can be directly attributed to a democratic consensus is the "Declaration of Managua for the Promotion of Democracy and Development." By the end of the 1980s, it was clear that having elected

⁴⁷The Americas in 1994: A Time for Leadership, op. cit., p. 9.

⁴⁸Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 21.

civilian governments, holding free elections, and ending civil conflict did not guarantee a strong and effective democratic system. New and fragile democracies still had to deal with many of the same problems that had plagued authoritarian regimes, such as,

...military autonomy and impunity, ineffective and (often) corrupt police and judicial systems, weak party structures, the lack of a tradition of legislative independence, the failure to develop effective constitutional limits on executive abuses of power, massive problems in public administration, and a lack of fiscal accountability.⁴⁹

It became clear that many weak democratic nations were threatened by widespread poverty, social barriers, low education levels and in need of immediate help.

In Managua, Nicaragua on 8 June 1993, the Nineteenth Special Session of the General Assembly adopted a sweeping call for international support to strengthen democratic institutions throughout the hemisphere by amending the OAS Charter to include the Protocol of Managua. The General Assembly recognized that the mission of the OAS is not only to defend democracy where it has collapsed, but also to prevent and anticipate the very causes of the problems that work against democratic rule. In addition to strengthening shaky democracies, the Protocol of Managua established the

⁴⁹Millett, op. cit., p. 9.

Inter-American Council for Integral Development (CIDI). The purpose of the Council is to "...promote cooperation among the American States for the purpose of achieving integral development and, in particular, helping to contribute to eliminate extreme poverty."⁵⁰ The creation of CIDI demonstrates OAS commitment to the promotion of democracy and that it believes extreme poverty obstructs the full democratic development of the hemisphere. The Declaration of Managua also included a list of specific areas where OAS assistance and hemispheric cooperation could strengthen the foundations of democracy, including: developing government institutions and public administration, promoting economic development and the defense of the environment, making the military "subordinate to the legitimately constituted civilian authority," combating the narcotic traffic, and promoting national reconciliation.⁵¹

The new initiatives and democratic resolve of the OAS were put to the test on 5 April 1992, when President Alberto Fujimori (with support of the military) suspended the national constitution, dissolved the Congress, replaced the

⁵⁰Annual Report of the Secretary General 1993-1994, General Secretariat, Organization of American States (Washington, D.C., 1994), p. XVII.

⁵¹Millett, op. cit., p. 10.

civil judiciary with a form of martial law, censored the media, and ruled by decree. Fujimori's *auto-golpe* was quickly condemned by the OAS which called for the suspension of all financial assistance, and the U.S. assisted by ensuring that the multilateral financial institutions suspended disbursements to Peru.

The OAS finally worked out an agreement wherein President Fujimori would move rapidly "...(a) to restore democratic rule, (b) to diminish the more arbitrary aspects of his new regime, and (c) to restore at least some of the suspended civil rights."⁵² Under the watchful eye of monitors from the OAS and international observers, elections were held for delegates to a constitutional convention and municipal offices. By 14 December 1992, the OAS declared the Peruvian case closed even though Peru was not an institutional democracy. The pressures brought to bear on Peru had been limited because the OAS ministers "...were more influenced by a sense of the precariousness of life for much of its population, by the brittleness of the state, by signs of public support for the coup, by Fujimori's gestures of respect for the OAS, and above all by his personal appearance before the committee of ministers and

⁵²Ibid., p. 15.

accommodating style."⁵³

Guatemala is another instance where the OAS flexed its new democracy promoting muscles. On 25 May 1993, Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano Elias (with the backing of the Guatemalan military) suspended the Constitution, closed Congress, dissolved the Constitutional Court, intervened in the judicial branch of government, and instituted censorship of the media in Guatemala. As directed by Resolution 1080, OAS Secretary General Clemente Joao Baena Soares immediately convoked a meeting of the Permanent Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. As a result, the Permanent Council of the OAS "urged" Serrano to restore democratic institutions, and at the invitation of Guatemala's Government, sent Secretary General Baena Soares to Guatemala on a fact-finding mission with the Foreign Ministers of Barbados, Nicaragua, and Uruguay.

The U.S. supported the actions of the OAS and responded to the situation by issuing a traveler's advisory and threatening to impose trade sanctions on Guatemala. Mexico

⁵³Tom Farer, "Collectively Defending Democracy in the western Hemisphere: New Paradigm, Uncertain Steps," Inter-American Dialogue (Washington, D.C., May 1994), p. 88, quoting Viron Vaky and Heraldo Muñoz, The future of the Organization of American States (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1993), p. 82.

also denounced the coup and played a pivotal role in mobilizing the international community to censure the action.⁵⁴ It is interesting to note those old Cold War antagonists, Mexico and the U.S., were together on the same side during the Guatemala crisis. This shows that consensus, not U.S. power led to OAS action in Guatemala.

The fact-finding team met with representatives of the Guatemalan government and with leaders of most sectors of society. The fact-finding mission reported to the OAS Permanent Council that the Guatemalan people refused "...to accept the disruption of democracy and supported their efforts to find a democratic solution consistent with their Constitution and their laws."⁵⁵

The Guatemalans were encouraged by all of the international opposition to the coup, but were distressed by the potential impact the threatened economic sanctions might have on their economy. Consequently, they organized the *Instancia Nacional de Consenso* to press for restoration of constitutional rule. As Ambassador Vaky noted in his recent essay, "...most observers present in Guatemala at the time

⁵⁴Millett, op. cit., p. 16.

⁵⁵Annual Report of the Secretary General 1993-1994, op. cit., p. XV.

agree that the team's presence and its discussion with all parties were helpful in crystallizing the momentum for restoration of democratic procedures."⁵⁶

With rising domestic and international opposition and another inspection by Secretary General Baena Soares and the Foreign Minister of Ecuador, Serrano's military supporters abandoned him. Jorge Serrano resigned and fled into exile. Acting in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution in force, the Guatemalan Congress appointed Ramiro de Leon Carpio as President of the Republic on 5 June 1993. On 8 June, the OAS closed its ad hoc meeting of the Permanent Council and offered to provide whatever assistance was needed to support Guatemalan democracy.

During the crises in Guatemala, the OAS went beyond mere rhetoric in its efforts to protect democracy. The OAS took the steps called for in Resolution 1080 and was able to overcome the "sacred" principles of sovereignty and the old tradition of honoring nonintervention above all else.

The dedication of the OAS to the promotion and defense of democracy was pushed to the limit by a military coup in Haiti. On 16 December 1990, after five years of military

⁵⁶Farer, op. cit., p. 87, quoting Viron Vaky and Heraldo Muñoz, The future of the Organization of American States (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1993), pp. 16-27.

governments, fraudulent elections, and coup d'etats, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president in free and fair elections with 67 percent of the vote. On 30 September 1991, less than one year after those elections, the Aristide government was overthrown by Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Raoul Cedras. The Permanent Council of the OAS met in an emergency session, condemned the coup, and supported the desire of the Haitian people to restore their constitutional government and democratic institutions. The OAS called for the full restoration of the Haitian constitutional regime, and the immediate reinstatement of President Aristide. In addition, the OAS declared that it would only recognize appointees of Aristide as the country's legitimate representatives, and called for all states to sever their economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti. The OAS then authorized an International Civilian Mission to go in and protect human rights and re-establish constitutional government. Late in 1993 however, the Mission had to be pulled out because hostilities directed at them put their safety in peril. The International Civilian Mission was able to return to Haiti in late January 1994.

After a short time, it became obvious that the requested economic boycott was full of holes, as goods continued to arrive from a group of countries that routinely

ignored the embargo. Tom Farer noted that economic sanctions,

...are a gross violation of human rights, since they hurt the non-elites in the offending nation the most. Moreover, by ruining economic prosperity and the middle sectors, economic sanctions tend to quell the only domestic sources of democratic pressure in the target country. In addition, effective sanctioning requires collective participation. One defection can be sufficient for the collapse of the mechanism, and...the incentives for defection are always high when sanctions are costly.⁵⁷

By May of 1992, the OAS Ministers called upon member states to deny visas to the supporters of the coup, to freeze their assets and to "...adopt whatever actions may be necessary for the greater effectiveness of the embargo."⁵⁸ In December of 1992, the OAS referred the Haiti problem to the United Nations despite the complaints it received from the noninterventionist states, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Brazil. United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed former Argentine Foreign Minister, Dante Caputo as a special negotiator. Shortly thereafter, it was announced that OAS Secretary General Baena Soares had chosen Caputo to represent the OAS as well.

⁵⁷Javier Corrales, "Advancing Democracy and Human Rights in the Americas: What Role for the OAS? Rapporteur's Report," Inter-American Dialogue (Washington, D.C., May 1994), p. 6.

⁵⁸Farer, op. cit., p. 89.

By June 1993, it was evident that Caputo's efforts to obtain a political agreement had stalled, so the UN Security Council froze Haiti's assets abroad and imposed a worldwide mandatory oil and weapons' embargo at the request of the U.S., Canada, Venezuela, and France. This got the attention of the Haitian military and its upper-class supporters. As a result, on 3 July 1993, their representatives

...signed the Governor's Island Agreement which contemplated amnesty for the armed forces, the resignation of the commander of the armed forces, General Cedras, the return of Aristide by the end of October to serve as president, the previous assumption of day-to-day authority by moderate reformists acceptable to Aristide, and a relatively very large international presence for an unlimited period to monitor the human rights situation, "professionalize" a new police force, which (although it would be made up of persons presently serving in the army and the police) would be independent of the military authorities, and to assist in rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.⁵⁹

The Cedras regime failed to comply with the Governor's Island Accord and the UN imposed further sanctions including the cancellation of all commercial flights to and from Haiti. On 11 July 1994, after even further sanctions were imposed, General Cedras expelled all UN and OAS human rights observers.

In September, President Clinton sent a special three-

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 90.

man delegation to Haiti to discuss the peaceful departure of the military government. The delegation included former President Jimmy Carter, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn. With 61 U.S. war planes already in the air on their way to Haiti, the military regime of General Raoul Cedras signed a one-page agreement that allowed the invasion to be called off and began the process of restoring Aristide and democracy to Haiti.

The Haitian case is not the typical U.S. driven Cold War-style unilateral foray into a small Caribbean country. The OAS had the full support of its member states as it directed and coordinated hemispheric efforts to restore democracy to Haiti. Nations from the region, "...most notably Argentina, were consulted and...offered their support for the blockade on the principle that the democratic form of government must be upheld no matter what the ideology of the current incumbent."⁶⁰ This is another example of how Kantian liberalism and the democratic consensus are breathing new life into the OAS, and how they are helping the Inter-American System make the necessary

⁶⁰Paul G. Buchanan and Mari-Luci Jaramillo, "United States Defense Policy for the Western Hemisphere," North South the Magazine of the Americas (Miami), Vol. 4 No. 1, July-August, 1994, p. 6.

changes to deal with Post-Cold War challenges.

In a speech given to the Permanent Council of the OAS upon assuming the office of Secretary General, César Gaviria-Trujillo declared, "...the primordial responsibility of the OAS clearly is political action to defend, promote, and develop democracy."⁶¹ The situations in Peru, Guatemala, and Haiti demonstrate the genuine commitment of the OAS to preserve democratic systems in the Americas.

The growing democratic consensus has kept the OAS very busy as a key player in hemispheric affairs, which is a definite improvement over its Cold War "rigor mortis." The recent changes in the OAS clearly show Graham Allison's approach does not work. The realist approach does not work either because the democratic consensus, not U.S. hegemonic pursuit of democracy explains why Latin America would solidly support the OAS in its new democratic role.

⁶¹César Gaviria Trujillo, Address to the Permanent Council, Organization of American States, Washington, D.C., 15 September 1994.

IV. INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD

Realism explains why the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) was distrusted by both the U.S. and Latin America during the Cold War⁶². This section however, will show that Kantian liberalism offers the best explanation of why the IADB is undergoing substantial change to overcome the distrust and maximize its potential in the Post-Cold War era.

After Hitler began World War II, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American states conducted their First Consultation in Panama, on 23 September 1939, and declared that American neutrality extended throughout the western hemisphere. In midsummer of 1940, shortly after the German invasion of the Netherlands and the armistice with occupied France, the Foreign Ministers met for their Second Consultation in Havana, Cuba. Their main purpose was to discuss the problem of status of the Dutch and French colonies and possessions. The Foreign Ministers issued a statement entitled, "Reciprocal Assistance and Defensive Cooperation Among American Nations." The statement proclaimed that,

...any attempt on the part of a non-American state against the integrity or the inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political

⁶²The IADB is the oldest permanent multinational military organization in the world.

independence of an American state should be considered as an act of aggression against all American states and in the event acts of aggression were committed or there were threats of aggression, the American nations would consult among themselves in order to agree upon the steps it would be advisable to take.⁶³

On 15 January 1942, the Third Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs was convened by the U.S. in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The Foreign Ministers adopted Resolution XXXIV, which called for "the immediate meeting in Washington of a commission composed of the military and naval technicians appointed by each of the Governments to...recommend to them the measures necessary for the defense of the Continent."⁶⁴ Resolution XXXIV established the IADB which was made up of one military representative from each member of the Pan American Union.⁶⁵ It was officially established on 30 March 1942, when it convened in Washington, D.C. to study and recommend to their respective governments, the necessary measures for defending the American continent. The Resolution made the IADB "...permanent in nature as long as the present emergency

⁶³Didier Operetti, Hemispheric Security - Inter-American Defense Board (Report of the Rapporteur), Organization of American States (Washington, D.C., 12 May 1992), p. 3.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 4.

⁶⁵At that time, there were 21 members of the Pan American Union.

endures."⁶⁶

Three years later, an Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace was held in February 1945, in Mexico City. It adopted Resolution IV, titled, "Creation of a Permanent Military Agency," and Resolution IX, titled, "Reorganization, Consolidation and Strengthening of the Inter-American System."⁶⁷ Resolution IV recommended that "the IADB continue to operate as an Inter-American defense agency until the permanent military agency contained initially in the Resolution [could] be established."⁶⁸ Resolution IX created different organs of the Inter-American System, the Inter-American Juridical Committee, the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense (Advisory Defense Committee), and gave the Governing Board of the Pan American Union the power to supervise the IADB and receive and approve its annual report.

In 1948, the Ninth International Conference of American States held in Bogota, Colombia, decided the IADB should continue as a permanent agency, but not under the Charter of

⁶⁶Opertti, op. cit., p. 4.

⁶⁷Manuel Canyes, The Organization of American States and The United Nations (Washington, D.C., 1958), p. 4.

⁶⁸Study of Possible Alternatives to Determine the OAS/IADB Juridical Link, Inter-American Defense Board Staff (Washington D.C., 24 February 1994), p.6.

the OAS. The IADB was kept out of the OAS because it was "...understood that the creation of a council of this type within the Charter made it necessary to have a standing military body as a part of the inter-American system, and that this would not be advisable."⁶⁹ In exchange, the Advisory Defense Committee was incorporated into the Charter. Resolution XXXIV of the Ninth Conference titled, "Inter-American Defense Board," ruled that "...the Board would continue acting as the organ for preparation of collective self-defense against aggression until the American governments would decide, by a two-thirds majority, to consider its work terminated."⁷⁰ Although the Ninth Conference did not make the IADB a member of the OAS, it ruled that the expenses required to run the IADB would be included in the budget of the OAS. This arrangement created problems years later when the OAS sought to gain control of the IADB, and the IADB sought to gain control over its own budget.

The Advisory Defense Committee was to advise the Consultation of Foreign Ministers on problems of military cooperation when it came to special treaties on collective

⁶⁹Opertti, op. cit., p. 6.

⁷⁰Ibid.

security. When the OAS Consultation activated the Advisory Defense Committee, the IADB's Council of Delegates was supposed to advise the committee and the IADB's secretariat was to function as the committee's secretariat. It is interesting to note that not once has the Advisory Defense Committee ever been activated. Despite the lack of direct institutional interaction with the OAS, the IADB assisted the OAS during the 1963 Cuban supported subversion attempt in Venezuela; the 1965 crisis in the Dominican Republic; and the 1969 and 1976 El Salvador-Honduras incidents.⁷¹

Realism explains that the IADB was restricted and distrusted during the Cold War because of balance-of-power issues. Even though the IADB managed to assist the OAS on occasion, the OAS never convoked the Advisory Defense Committee and resisted the IADB's attempts to gain a more significant and active role in hemispheric issues. The OAS was relatively weak, and did not want to increase IADB strength and recognition by giving it important missions. The U.S. did not want to use the IADB, because as regional hegemon, it wanted to maintain direct control of any

⁷¹Martinez, op. cit., p. 51. It is interesting to note that the IADB prepared plans for the organization of an "Inter-American Armed Force" during the 1965 crisis in the Dominican Republic.

military action in the region and preferred to handle crisis unilaterally. Also, Latin American leaders were leery of the IADB because it was a permanent military organ in the Inter-American System, and they feared it could eventually grow in power and be used for intervention in the hemisphere.

More recently, the IADB's situation has been completely turned around. The OAS has demonstrated specific interest in the security of the continent, the IADB's area of expertise. Resolutions from OAS meetings in the Bahamas (Resolution 1181) in 1992, and in Managua (Resolution 3015) in 1993, were designed to legitimize the OAS-IADB relationship to fully utilize the potential of the IADB in security matters. In 1992, a Special Committee on Hemispheric Security was created by the Permanent Council of the OAS to study the alternative legal-institutional relationships, competence, and functioning of the IADB. The special committee highlighted the obsolescence of the Hemisphere Security System due to the end of the Cold War, and found the Cold War paradigms, built on relatively static concepts of conflict or war were no longer valid or relevant.⁷² The following year, the General Assembly of the

⁷²Hernán M. Patiño Mayer, Support For a New Concept of Hemisphere Security Cooperative Security, Permanent Council

OAS approved resolution AG/RES. 1240 (XXXIII-0/93), which called for further clarification of the existing legal-institutional link between the IADB and the OAS.

The OAS wants to end the more than fifty years of legal imprecision that has hindered the utilization of the region's military institution by placing the professional-technical resources of the Board in the framework of the Charter and control the use of financial resources instead of merely providing them. It would also,

Evaluate, and where necessary, improve the IADB's organization and operating system, to achieve a fuller utilization of its capabilities in accordance with any criteria on the subject that may be set by the Organization of American States in the framework of the new concepts being defined in the area of security.⁷³

Until the legal-institutional linkage between the OAS and IADB is settled, the General Assembly of the OAS resolved that the various organs of the OAS may seek the technical and military advice of the IADB, but that it cannot be "operational" in nature.

The Kantian approach explains the current juridical and legal debate between the IADB and the OAS as being a result

of the Organization of American States, Special Committee on Hemisphere Security (Washington, D.C., 17 May 1993), p. 1.

⁷³Ibid., p. 12.

of the Kantian liberal environment. The spread of democratic values has made civilian institutions more influential giving them more control over the military, which in turn, causes them to be more responsible to civilian authority. The same holds true for civilian run international organizations such as the OAS. With increasing support from the democratic states of the region, the OAS is growing and beginning to exercise ever greater control over the militarily dominated IADB. From the Kantian perspective, the OAS is trying to ensure that the military organ of the Inter-American System is becoming more subordinate to civilian control by adopting changes that enhance democratic values.

The IADB recently underwent a massive reorganization process to try and bring its expenses in line with the budget approved by the OAS General Assembly. It terminated 46 percent of its staff and took measures to buffer the effects that the reduction-in-force would have on the services provided.⁷⁴ The OAS reduced the funds of the IADB so that its budget would be more in proportion to the budget the OAS has to operate with.

⁷⁴Annual Report of the Secretary General 1993-1994, op. cit., p. 103.

According to the current Chairman of the IADB, Major General James R. Harding (U.S. Army), the current mission of the IADB is to prepare plans and recommendations for collective defense for the consideration of American Governments, and to perform advisory functions when requested by the Advisory Defense Counsel of the OAS. It will operate the Inter-American Defense College to prepare selected military and civilian officials for future leadership responsibilities in continental defense.⁷⁵ A debate currently surrounds changing the IADB's mission statement to reflect peace operations, disaster relief, and confidence and security building measures.

In response to its new Kantian liberal environment, the IADB has made some important adjustments. In order to join the IADB, a state had to be an American state, be a member of the OAS, be committed to IADB rules and regulations, apply for membership, and receive a two-thirds majority vote by the OAS. The IADB dropped the two-thirds majority vote

<u>Inter-American Defense Board</u> <u>Newest Members</u>	
1993:	Trinidad and Tobago
1994:	Barbados, Surinam
1995:	Antigua and Barbuda

Figure 2 - Newest IADB Members

⁷⁵Major General James R. Harding, Security Challenges and Opportunities in the Americas, Inter-American Defense Board (Washington, D.C., no date), p. 21.

requirement and has recently increased its membership to twenty-six charter members:

Antigua and Barbuda (figure 2), Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba (active participation suspended), the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.⁷⁶

Its role has now changed to include the nontraditional military task of peace building operations. Peace building operations use military resources to help peacemakers and other nations rebuild the infrastructures and institutions of countries torn apart by civil war and other conflict. The IADB was actively involved in a peace building operation in Nicaragua and arranged for a group of Nicaraguans to be trained in mine clearing operations to remove mines planted during the fighting in the 1980's. Nicaragua claims to have pulled 6,000 mines with the help of IADB training and equipment. Currently, an IADB team with members from the U.S., Brazil, and Colombia is in Jamastran, Honduras, training soldiers from Costa Rica and Honduras in mine clearing operations. The next phase of its peace building project will provide countermine training to Guatemalan

⁷⁶The Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Panama, and Haiti are not active members of the IADB because they have not sent a representative delegation.

soldiers.

The IADB has also developed and submitted a number of studies and recommendations to member governments. These include a study on drug trafficking, an organization and procedures manual for peacekeeping, a study on disaster relief preparedness and operations, and a study on the interoperability of equipment among member nations.⁷⁷

Another significant modification of the IADB due to the Kantian liberal environment is the change that now allows civilian officials to attend classes at the Inter-American Defense College (IADC). The IADC is a Senior Service college located at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, D.C., and is a subordinate part of the IADB. IADC attendance was originally limited to military officers from only IADB member states but attendance is now open to both civilian officials and military officers from any state that is a member of the OAS. IADC enrollment requirements state that civilian officials must: be selected by his country, be a government official of an American republic; have as far as possible, a university degree; and have the rank, seniority, professional experience, and possibilities of future employment, comparable to those required for military

⁷⁷Harding, op. cit., p. 22.

students. Matriculation rules allow attendance of one civilian student per country, provided at least one military student from the same country is also appointed.⁷⁸ The mission of the IADC is to educate and prepare military officers and civilian officials for contributions in hemispheric security through a study of the Inter-American System. It also develops and broadens leadership and diplomatic skills, and instructs students in the political, military, social, and economic disciplines.

In addition to changing their enrollment requirements, the IADC curriculum has undergone significant change and now offers a wide variety of new topics that are relevant to a predominantly democratic Latin America. The new topics include international peacekeeping military forces, promotion of democracy, the environment, economic integration, human rights, health, education, and drug trafficking.⁷⁹

Although realism accounts for IADB actions during the Cold War, it fails to explain current changes in the IADB. The Kantian approach however, proves those changes to the

⁷⁸The Class of 1994 was made up of forty-four military officers and six civilians.

⁷⁹Inter-American Defense College, Directive 3.0, Curriculum 1994-1995 (Washington, D.C., June 1994), pp. 26-37.

IADB, such as, new nontraditional military roles, civilian student bodies, and courses dealing with democratic subjects were brought about by its newly defined democratic environment.

V. THE UNITED STATES AND THE MILITARY

As the Soviet Bloc crumbled and fell apart, U.S. foreign policy gradually changed from communist containment to democracy promotion. In the early 80s, the U.S. began to learn that dealing with democracies had some direct benefits and finally took advantage of basing foreign policy on the support of democracy. El Salvador taught the Reagan Administration just how advantageous it could be to deal with democratic governments. After lots of urging, lobbying, and money, a series of elections were held that ushered in Jose Napoleon Duarte as president. Instead of supporting a hard-line military regime, or ceding to leftist guerrillas, the U.S. had a very cooperative democratic government it could champion. Assisting democratic growth was later implemented in Honduras, Guatemala, Paraguay, Chile, and Nicaragua. During the 80s, it was learned that democracies made it easier for both U.S. businesses and an administration in Washington to operate abroad and carry on diplomatic relations. Howard Wiarda effectively describes just how crucial democracies can be for an administration in Washington:

Having democracies as our allies enable an administration to have good relations with the Congress instead of poisonous ones, to give it political space to carry out other important policies, to have good rapport with the media and less for them to wax indignant about, to have good relations with our allies instead of these being

clouded by peripheral (e.g., Nicaragua) issues, to keep the religious and human rights lobbies off the administration's back, to reduce the nastiness and divisiveness of the domestic debate in favor of a more consensual and supportable policy.⁸⁰

U.S. policy regarding the promotion of democracy was not fully realized until the Cold War completely removed the "communist threat." With the end of the Cold War and a strong democratic consensus in the western hemisphere, the U.S. is now focusing on a democratic agenda. The importance of the democratic agenda was demonstrated when the Clinton Administration declared the "promotion of democracy abroad,"⁸¹ as one of its main goals. Over several years, President Clinton has implemented legislation for NAFTA; met for the first time with the democratically elected leaders of Central America at the White House; and hosted a Western Hemisphere Summit in Miami for all the democratically elected heads of state of North America, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean.⁸²

⁸⁰Howard J. Wiarda, American Foreign Policy Toward Latin America in the 80s and 90s: Issues and Controversies from Reagan to Bush (New York, 1992), p. 315.

⁸¹A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, July 1994, p. I.

⁸²Richard E. Feinberg, "The Hemispheric Community of Democracies: Agenda for Collective Action," The United States Department of State Dispatch, (Washington, January 17, 1994), V, No. 3.

Kantian liberalism predicts a more peaceful region now that it is made up mostly of democracies. One of the challenges now facing the region's military institutions in the face of democratic reforms is defining the role of the military during peacetime. It is imperative that military institutions maintain their professionalism and avoid partisan politics.

In a democratic system the military institutions must be credible to both the military professional and to the society it serves. The responsibility of the military professional is to be prepared to apply violence in a measured, ethical, and legal manner for national political purposes. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, highlights the importance of security and the need to "...be ready to fight, just in case."⁸³

A constructive approach to security is collective security, and the starting place for collective security is reaching an agreement on the priority of tasks that would require the use of multinational forces. For years, collective security in the hemisphere was subordinate to the

⁸³Gabriel Marcella, Warriors in Peacetime: Future missions of the Latin American Armed Forces, an Exploratory Essay, U.S. Army War College, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, December 8, 1992), p. 2.

unilateral perspective of the U.S., which had the effect of making it neither consensual nor collective. In the new era of liberal democracy however, civilian institutions, such as the OAS, are playing a greater role in defining the requirements for collective security.

External threats to security are the primary responsibility of the military, while internal threats are normally handled by police forces until they are no longer able to handle the problem. The boundaries between civilians and military are blurring in the post-Cold War environment due mainly to the revolution in communications and the international disorder brought on by terrorism, narcotrafficking, and the clandestine movement of people and arms.⁸⁴

The end of East-West military competition and the Kantian democratic consensus that replaced it provides new incentives for democratic societies in the western hemisphere to reduce the size of their military forces in order to allocate resources for economic and democratic development. In response to its new liberal environment, the U.S. has made foreign policy changes, cut its military budget, and is downsizing its military forces significantly.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 8.

U.S. military educational institutions also have changed by adding new courses that deal with democratic issues.

One such institution is the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA), a bilingual military educational institution that trains approximately 1,600 students each year. It was originally established in 1946, at Fort Amador in the Panama Canal Zone, but was later moved to its present location at Fort Benning, Georgia. Throughout the years, the SOA has trained more than 60,000 officers, cadets, and noncommissioned officers from Latin America and the U.S. The annual training goal of the SOA is,

...to develop and conduct for the armed forces of Latin America, the most doctrinally sound, relevant, and cost effective training programs possible; enhance military professionalism; foster greater cooperation among the multinational military forces; and expand the Latin American armed forces' knowledge of U.S. customs and traditions.⁸⁵

The curriculum at the SOA was recently changed to offer courses dealing with the important areas of democratic sustainment, peace operations, civil control of the military, human rights and the military, and resource management. In addition, the SOA added a training course in countermine operations at the request of the OAS and IADB to

⁸⁵School of the Americas, United States Army, Fort Benning, Georgia, 1995 Course Catalog (Georgia, 1995), p. 2.

help Central American soldiers to clear the 130,000 mines laid during the wars of the 1980s.⁸⁶

When institutions like the SOA, steeped in tradition, begin changing and becoming more "democracy friendly," it becomes clear through Kantian liberalism that the U.S. has joined the democratic consensus that has drawn the western hemisphere together. The U.S. treats the other nations as equals, team mates, and as members of the Kantian liberal pacific union.

Realists would argue, however, that the U.S. just swapped one foreign policy out for another, and continue to strong-arm its Latin American neighbors into supporting its new democracy promoting policy. The problem is, realism cannot account for the region-wide consensus that democratic values are vital for continued peace, economic growth, and cooperation in the hemisphere. In contrast to the heated debates in the OAS regarding U.S. Cold War policy, the issue of promoting democracy has not caused any major dissention. The nations of the western hemisphere have come together in support of the institutions that promote their common democratic values. This is the reason the Inter-American System has seen rapid growth and change. Kantian liberalism

⁸⁶Douglas Waller, "Running a 'School for Dictators,'" Newsweek, August 9, 1993, p. 35.

is the answer, not Graham Allison's bureaucratic inertia and organizational rigidities nor U.S. pressure as the realists claim.

VI. CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis was to examine and explain current changes in the Inter-American System from the framework of three alternative theoretical viewpoints. First, because changes to the System are clearly occurring, the inadequacies of Graham Allison's model II were quickly discussed and discarded. Second, realism fails to demonstrate that regional institutional change is a result of the U.S. forcing a new democratic policy. Third, Kantian liberal theory explains that common democratic values and consensus are forcing the widespread changes in the Inter-American System and the western hemisphere. The organs of the Inter-American System are adjusting to the Post-Cold War's newly defined paradigm shift and are redefining the important parts they must play in promoting democratic peace and cooperation.

Like other international organizations, the OAS suffers from old battle scars still showing from the Cold War. However, the OAS is now the premier forum in the Americas for dialogue and Inter-American cooperation. The creation of the Democracy Unit, the Santiago Commitment, and the Washington and the Managua Protocols, demonstrates the ongoing efforts of the OAS to maximize its potential in the evolving Kantian liberal environment. Now that the OAS has the support of Latin American democracies, it can update its

agenda to include: strengthening and protecting democracy, human rights, the environment, security in the hemisphere, and drug trafficking. The OAS is no longer impotent because the organizations of the System can exercise a great deal of influence in international events and can serve to legitimize, as well as, to arbitrate what is acceptable for the international community. This fact is demonstrated by the pro-active role the OAS played in Guatemala, Peru, and Haiti.

Changes within the IADB are also critical because even though increased democratization and the end of the Cold-War strengthened regional political cooperation, it left military relationships about the same as they were half a century ago. Renewed interest in the IADB as a tool to further democratic values has brought about important changes allowing it to help improve critical civil-military relations. Through increased civil-military exchange recently made possible at the IADC, the IADB is now able to lead the region's military institutions through a change in paradigms and help them step into the new era of Kantian liberalism and democratic peace. Civilian leaders still do not understand or trust the military because they fear intervention, and military leaders do not trust civilian leaders because they fear they will lose direct control

over their forces, that their budgets will be slashed or they will lose their livelihoods. The IADB is the only organization in the Inter-American System with the existing capacity, infrastructure and technical expertise currently helping wary civilian and military leaders come together and forge new ties based on trust and understanding. By continuing down Kant's road to the "liberal pacific union," the western hemisphere can successfully confront whatever challenges lie ahead through regional cooperation, multilateral action, and the protection of democratic values.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

MEMBER STATES

Antigua and Barbuda	Guyana
Argentina	Haiti
The Bahamas (<i>Commonwealth of</i>)	Honduras
Barbados	Jamaica
Belize	Mexico
Bolivia	Nicaragua
Brazil	Panama
Canada	Paraguay
Chile	Peru
Colombia	St. Kitts and Nevis
Costa Rica	Saint Lucia
Cuba	Saint Vincent and the
Dominica (<i>Commonwealth of</i>)	Grenadines
Dominican Republic	Suriname
Ecuador	Trinidad and Tobago
El Salvador	United States
Grenada	Uruguay
Guatemala	Venezuela

Table 1 - OAS Member States

THE SANTIAGO RESOLUTIONS OF THE OAS

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

(Resolution adopted at the fifth plenary session, 5 June 1991)

WHEREAS:

The Preamble of the Charter of the OAS establishes that representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace, and development of the region;

Under the provisions of the Charter, One of the basic purposes of the OAS is to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of non-intervention;

Due respect must be accorded to the policies of each member country in regard to the recognition of states and governments;

In view of the widespread existence of democratic governments in the hemisphere, the principle, enshrined in the Charter, that the solidarity of the American states and the high aims which it pursues require the political organization of those states to be based on effective exercise of representative democracy must be made operative; and

The region still faces serious political, social, and economic problems that may threaten the stability of democratic governments.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

RESOLVES:

1. To instruct the Secretary General to call for the immediate convocation of a meeting of the Permanent Council in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's member states, in order, within the framework of the Charter, to examine the situation, decide on and convene an ad hoc meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or a special session of the General Assembly, all of which must take place within a ten-day period.

2. To state that the purpose of the ad hoc meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or the special session of the General Assembly shall be to look into the events collectively and adopt any decisions deemed appropriate, in accordance with the Charter and international law.

3. To instruct the Permanent Council to devise a set of proposals that will serve as incentives to preserve and strengthen democratic systems, based on international solidarity and cooperation, and to apprise the General Assembly thereof at its twenty-second regular session.

Table 2 - The Santiago Resolutions of the OAS

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